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Abstract We consider the cost sharing problemwith divisible demands of hetero-
geneous goods. We propose a cost sharing method called Proportionally Adjusted
Marginal Pricing (PAMP)method. PAMP is a nonadditive (in the cost function) ex-
tension of average cost pricing. We introduce an axiom called Local Independence
(LI) and use LI together with Continuity, Proportionality, and Scale Invariance to
characterize PAMP.
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1 Introduction
Consider the cost sharingmodel with divisible demands of heterogeneous goods. In
this model, the Aumann-Shapley pricing method (Tauman 1988) has been shown
to be the only extension of average cost pricing within the family of cost sharing
methods satisfying Shapley’s (1953) two basic axioms, Additivity and Dummy.
Recently, within the same family alternative cost sharing methods have been pro-
posed and characterized by selecting other equity and /or incentive axioms (Moulin
and Friedman 1999). At the same time, incompatibility results between Additivity
and various combinations of other relevant axioms have been found (e.g., Moulin
and Friedman 1999). As a structural invariance axiom, Additivity has played a cen-
tral role in the literature of axiomatic cost sharing but at the same time has ruled
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out potentially meaningful nonadditive cost sharing methods (Moulin 1999). There
has been a growing interest in searching for nonadditive cost sharing methods. For
example, Sprumont (1998) has proposed a few nonadditive methods including a
nonadditive extension of average cost pricing in the two-agent case.
This paper proposes and axiomatizes an alternative nonadditive extension of
average cost pricing called Proportionally Adjusted Marginal Pricing (PAMP).
PAMP simply normalizes the marginal cost pricing into a cost sharing method.
More precisely, PAMP is defined as a weighted average cost pricing, where the
quantity demanded by each agent is weighted by its marginal cost.
To obtain a characterization of PAMP, we introduce a Local Independence
axiom, which replaces the Additivity axiom used in the characterization of the
Aumann-Shapley pricing method (e.g., Billera and Heath 1982; Samet and Tauman
1982). Specifically, we characterize PAMP by Local Independence, Continuity,
Proportionality, and Scale Invariance. The Continuity is a technical condition but
it implies the traditional Dummy axiom.
Local Independence (LI) axiom requires that cost shares be invariant with
changes in the cost function that do not affect the value nor the derivatives of
the cost function at the given demand profile. Also a structural invariance axiom,
LI leaves rooms for nonadditive methods. Interestingly by combining with other
axioms (Dummy is replaced by Continuity) used in the characterization of the
Aumann-Shapley, LI characterizes PAMP.
2 The model
Let N = {1, ..., n} be the set of agents. Let RN+ be the nonnegative orthant of
RN , and let RN++ be the positive orthant of RN . A demand vector is a vector
q ∈ RN+ . Denote C0(N) the set of functions C : RN+ → R+, nondecreasing
with C(0) = 0. Denote ∂iC(·) = ∂C/∂qi (i ∈ N) when C is differentiable and
∇C(q) = (∂1C, ..., ∂nC).1 Denote C1(N) the set of all continuously differentiable
functions in C0(N) with ∇C(q) = 0, ∀q ∈ RN+ . Denote C+1 (N) the set of all
continuously differentiable functions in C0(N) with ∇C(q) ∈ RN++, ∀q ∈ RN+ .
A (cost sharing) problem is a list (N ; q;C) (or simply (q;C) if N is fixed) where
q ∈ RN+ and C ∈ C0(N). A (cost sharing) method is a mapping x that assigns to
each problem (q;C) a vector x(q;C) in RN+ such that
∑
i∈N
xi(q;C) = C(q).
3 Axioms
We propose the following axiom.
Local Independence (LI). For any q ∈ RN+ , and any C1, C2 ∈ C1(N), if C1 (q)
= C2 (q) and ∇C1(q) = ∇C2(q), then
x(q;C1) = x(q;C2).
1 If qi = 0, it is understood that ∂iC(q) stands for the right-hand derivative.
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Apparently, LI is a structural invariance axiom. It says that cost shares are
invariant with any changes in the cost function as long as there are neither changes
in the value nor in the derivatives of the cost function at the given demand profile.
However, LI does not rule out the possibility that cost shares may be affected by
those changes in the cost function that may eventually affect the derivatives of the
cost function at the demand profile.
We will combine LI with the following two well-known axioms.
Proportionality. IfC ∈ C0(N) is homogeneous, i.e., there is amapping c : R+ →
R+ such that
C(q) = c(
∑
i∈N
qi), ∀q ∈ RN+ ,
then
xi(q;C) =
qi∑
j∈N qj
c(
∑
j∈N
qj), i ∈ N. (1)
Scale Invariance. For any q ∈ RN+ , and any λ ∈ RN++.
x(q;C) = x(λq;Cλ)
where λq = (λ1q1, ..., λnqn) and
Cλ(p) = C(λ−11 p1, ..., λ
−1
n pn), ∀p ∈ RN+ .
4 The PAMP and the Aumann-Shapley pricing
Inmarginal cost pricing, agents are assignedwith the costs determinedby:∂iC(q)qi,
i ∈ N . The sum of these costs may not always equal to the total cost C(q), and
therefore marginal cost pricing is not a cost sharing method. On the other hand, the
average cost pricing (1) defined for the homogeneous goods model can not be used
directly in our heterogeneous goods model. Now we normalize the marginal cost
pricing into a cost sharing method in the following way.
Definition 1. The Proportionally Adjusted Marginal Pricing method (PAMP) is
defined by the following formula:
xPi (q;C) =
∂iC(q)qi∑
j∈N ∂jC(q)qj
C(q), i ∈ N. (2)
Thus, the PAMP can be regarded as a weighted average cost pricing with each
agent’s demand weighted by its marginal cost.
A well-known extension of average cost pricing in the literature is the Aumann-
Shapley pricing method defined by:
xASi (q, C) = qi
∫ 1
0
∂iC(tq)dt, i ∈ N. (3)
The Aumann-Shapley pricing method has been characterized by Proportionality,
Scale Invariance, Additivity, and Dummy.2
2 Additivity: For any q and any C1, C2, x(q;C1+C2) = x(q;C1)+x(q;C2); Dummy: For any
q, C, and any i ∈ N , if ∂iC(·) = 0 then xi(q;C) = 0.
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5 The characterization of PAMP
First, we characterize the PAMP on the domain C+1 (N).
Theorem 1. There exists a unique cost sharing method satisfying Local Indepen-
dence, Proportionality and Scale Invariance (on the domain C+1 (N)). It is the
Proportionally Adjusted Marginal Pricing method.
Proof. It is easy to check that the method xP defined by (2) satisfies these axioms.
Now we show that any method x˜ which satisfies these axioms will coincide with
xP .
Consider the family of cost functions defined by:
Cα(p) = (
∑
i∈N
pi)α, p ∈ RN+ , with α > 0.
By Proportionality, x˜ coincides with xP on this family. By Scale Invariance, it also
coincides with xP for every cost function of the form:
Cλ;α(p) = (
∑
i∈N
λipi)α, p ∈ RN+ , with α > 0, λi > 0, i ∈ N.
Indeed, the problem (q;Cλ,α) is equivalent to (λq;Cα) in the sense that
Cλ,α(p) = Cα(λp), ∀p ∈ RN+
and
Cλ,α(q) = Cα(λq).
Thus, by Scale Invariance and Proportionality,
x˜i(q;Cλ,α) = x˜i(λq;Cα)
=
λiqi∑
j∈N λjqj
Cα(λq)
=
∂iCλ,α(q)qi∑
j∈N ∂jCλ,α(q)qj
Cλ,α(q)
= xPi (q;Cλ,α), ∀i ∈ N.
Given an arbitrary cost function C in C+1 (N) and any q ∈ RN+ , we shall show that
there exists a unique (λ, α) ∈ RN++ ×R++ such that
Cλ,α(q) = C(q) and ∇Cλ,α(q) = ∇C(q). (4)
Thus, invoking Local Independence, we shall be able to conclude that
x˜(q;C) = x˜(q;Cλ,α) = xP (q;Cλ,α) = xP (q;C).
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Substituting the definition ofCλ,α into (4) yields the following systems of equations


∑
j∈N
λjqj


α
= C(q)
α


∑
j∈N
λjqj


α−1
λi = ∂iC(q), i ∈ N.
Using the first equation of this system, one can rewrite the second set as
αλi∑
j∈N λjqj
=
∂iC(q)
C(q)
, i ∈ N. (5)
Multiplying (5) by qi and summing yields
α = α :=
∑
i∈N ∂iC(q)qi
C(q)
> 0.
Substituting this value of α back into (5) yields the following system of linear
equations
∑
j∈N
λjqj =
∑
j∈N ∂jC(q)qj
∂iC(q)
λi, i ∈ N.
Clearly, for any γ > 0, γ(∂iC(q))i∈N is a positive solution of this system. For an
appropriate value γ of γ, γ(∂iC(q))i∈N is also a positive solution of


∑
j∈N
λjqj


α
= C(q).
The theorem is proved. unionsq
Next, we extend our characterization to the larger domain C1(N) using a tech-
nical condition called Continuity: x is continuous with respect to ∇C(q).
Theorem 2. The Proportionally Adjusted Marginal Pricing method is the unique
cost sharing method satisfying Local Independence, Continuity, Proportionality
and Scale Invariance (on the domain C1(N)).
Proof. The PAMP is uniquely determined by Local Independence, Proportionality
and Scale Invariance on the domain C+1 (N). Then by Continuity, it is uniquely
extended to the domain C1(N).
The theorem is proved. unionsq
We now consider the tightness of the characterization.
1) Dropping Local Independence
The Aumann-Shapley pricing method obviously satisfies all the remaining
axioms.
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2) Dropping Continuity
a) if C is homogeneous, let
xi(q;C) =
qi∑
j∈N qj
C(q), i ∈ N
b) if C is not homogeneous, then define
xNi (q;C) =
{
max{β1, ∂iC(q)qi} ifC(q) ≥
∑
j∈N ∂jC(q)qj
min{β2, ∂iC(q)qi} ifC(q) <
∑
j∈N ∂jC(q)qj
(6)
where β1 is the solution of equation:
∑
j∈N
max{β, ∂jC(q)qj} = C(q),
and β2 is the solution of equation:
∑
j∈N
min{β, ∂jC(q)qj} = C(q),
and let
xi(q;C) = xNi (q;C), ∀i ∈ N.
3) Dropping Proportionality
For any q and any C, let N0 = {i | ∂iC(·) = 0}, N ′ = N \ N0. Define
a) for i ∈ N0,
xi(q;C) = 0.
b) for i ∈ N ′,
xi(q;C) = xNi (q;C)
where xNi is defined by (6).
4) Dropping Scale Invariance
For any q and any C, let N0 = {i | ∂iC(·) = 0}, N ′ = N \ N0. Define
xi(q;C) =



qi∑
j∈N ′ qj
C(q) if i ∈ N ′
0 if otherwise
6 Other properties of PAMP
It is easy to check that PAMP also satisfies the following properties.
Distributivity axiom (Moulin and Shenker 1999). For any q ∈ RN+ and any
C1 ∈ C1(N), C2 ∈ C1({1}).
x(q;C2 ◦ C1) = x(x(q;C1);C2)
where
C2 ◦ C1(p) := C2(C1(p)), ∀x ∈ RN+ .
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Cost solidarity (Sprumont 1998). Let C1 and C2 be two cost functions. Suppose
there exists a mapping r : R+ → R+ such that C2 = r ◦ C1. Then, either
x(q;C1) 
 x(q;C2),
or
x(q;C1) = x(q;C2),
or
x(q;C1)  x(q;C2).
Note that Cost Solidarity suggests a stronger Local Independence condition defined
by 3
∇C2(q) = γ∇C1(q) with γ = 0 ⇒ x(q;C
2)
C2(q)
=
x(q;C1)
C1(q)
.
This stronger Local Independence condition is satisfied by PAMP and it implies
both Cost Solidarity and Local Independence.
Consistency (Thomson 1996). For all N,N ′ with N ′ ⊆ N , all q ∈ RN+ , C ∈
C1(N). If x = x(q;C), we have
xN
′
= xN
′
(qN ′ ; rxN ′(C)) (7)
where xN ′ is the restriction of x to N ′, and
rxN ′(C)(yN ′) := max{C(yN ′ , qN\N ′) −
∑
i∈N\N ′
xi(q;C), 0}, ∀yN ′ ∈ RN ′+
and we assume that rxN ′(C)(·) is continuously differentiable at qN ′ .
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